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Abstract A new product’s success in the marketplace largely
depends on salesforce actions. Many B2B salespeople display
conservatism when confronted with new products in their
portfolio, such that they maximize their efforts to sell existing
products before engaging in efforts to sell the new product. So
far, it is unclear whether this conservative selling behavior
(CSB) is harmful to new product selling performance, and
how this behavior can bemanaged. Building on perceived risk
processing theory, and employing multi-level structural equa-
tion modeling on a multi-source dataset, the authors empiri-
cally substantiate that salespeople’s CSB makes their effort to
sell new products more effective. Remarkably, such effort is
then valued less by sales managers. The authors also find that
CSB is a result of a risk assessment and evaluation
process, in which internal marketing efforts (i.e., provid-
ing salespeople with information on the new product)
determine the weight of perceived performance risk
(i.e., new product radicalness), social risk (i.e., manage-
rial new product orientation), and financial risk (i.e.,
long-term rewards). Managers looking to control the
levels of CSB in their salesforce should carefully align
their information support activities with the perceived
risk dimensions of the new product selling situation.
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Many business-to-business firms use their existing salesforce
to sell new products. Given the increasingly rapid introduction
of next generation products, salespeople face a complex prod-
uct portfolio in which new products compete with proven
sellers (Moore 2006). This requires salespeople to constantly
make choices on whether to sell a well-established product or
one that is new to the market and the salesperson, and thus
bears some risk and outcome uncertainty.
Managers generally attribute the lack of product success—
40 to 90% of all new products fail in the marketplace—to
salespeople’s choices for proven sellers, rather than trying to
sell new products (Ahearne et al. 2010; Wieseke et al. 2008).
Companies thus invest millions of dollars annually to make
new products look more attractive to salespeople (Fu et al.
2010). Particularly, they try to alter a salesperson’s risk per-
ceptions by providing information that makes the benefits of
the new product more salient and accessible in the individual’s
decision process. Unfortunately, this strategy seems unsuc-
cessful. Only 11% of B2B salespeople see product in-
formation as an enabler of closing profitable deals
(Corporate Visions 2015), and 85% to 90% of product
training has no lasting impact, which amounts to $4.25
billion of unproductive training in the U.S. alone (Stein
2011). Research by Accenture thus concludes that com-
panies Bhave been investing in programs that yield little
value^ (Angelos et al. 2017, p. 6).
Although managers consider the risk-averse stance of
salespeople toward new products to be dysfunctional
(Atuahene-Gima 1997), salesperson conservatism may not
be bad at all (Rackham 1998). Presenting customers with a
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proven seller before trying to sell the new product may help
the salesperson accentuate the benefits of the latter because
customers evaluate innovations vis-à-vis market-conform
product functionality and performance. In fact, some firms
have found that a careful exposure of customers to a new
product increases sales effectiveness compared to an approach
where customers hear all of the new product’s benefits but
lack a point of reference. For instance, when Sonoco, a U.S.-
based international packaging supplier, launched an innova-
tive packaging, its salesforce first explained existing packag-
ing to customers to provide them with a reference price. They
then promoted the new packaging, which had the same price
but an increased efficiency and a more distinctive look. This
conservative approach proved very effective (Anderson et al.
2006). Thus if salespeople’s conservatism is not as harmful as
managers think, firms’ investments to push salespeople to-
ward selling new products may be an unnecessary resource
drain or even counterproductive.
While the conservatism of salespeople stands virtual-
ly unexplored, there is clearly a strong need to know
how it relates to sales performance and what factors
stimulate or discourage salespeople’s conservatism. In
response we introduce the concept of conservative sell-
ing behavior (CSB) and build on perceived risk process-
ing theory (Conchar et al. 2004; Jacoby and Kaplan
1972) to investigate its antecedents and consequences.
Because the process of dealing with perceived risk is
inextricably linked with information processing (e.g.,
Conchar et al. 2004; Dowling and Staelin 1994), we
pay particular attention to the role of new product in-
formation provided to salespeople. We empirically sub-
stantiate that managers do not appreciate salespeople’s
conservatism, despite the fact that it proves to be an
effective strategy to sell new products. We then provide
clear insights into how sales managers may control
CSB. More specifically, we make at least three substan-
tive contributions to existing literature.
First, by introducing CSB we extend research on salesper-
son behavior in the new product selling domain. More specif-
ically, we define CSB as the extent to which a salesperson
maximizes selling efforts for existing products before engag-
ing in efforts to sell the new product. CSB does not imply
rejection of the new product; the salesperson may appreciate
the new offer and put in much effort to sell it (i.e., display a
high persistence or intensity), but only after the options to sell
existing products have been explored. This also sets CSB
apart from dysfunctional selling behavior (Atuahene-Gima
1997), or new product resistance or rejection (Kauppila et al.
2010). We contrast CSB with these behaviors and show that
CSB interacts with effort to positively affect new product sell-
ing performance.
Second, we add to literature on internal marketing of
new products toward salespeople. We define new
product information as the extent to which salespeople
within a unit are collectively provided with timely, rel-
evant, and accurate information on how the new product
addresses customer needs. While Atuahene-Gima (1997)
proposed that providing information to the salesforce
enhances new product selling effort, Anderson and
Robertson (1995) and Hughes (2013) were unable to
substantiate such effects. To resolve this ambiguity, we
conceptualize new product information as a contingency
factor and argue for its effects through the logic of
priming (Mandel 2003; Scheufele and Tewksbury
2007). Priming is providing an employee with a cue
that activates particular associations in memory prior
to executing a sales task. We posit that priming sales-
people with new product information alters the weights
of the perceived risks in salespeople’s behavioral deci-
sions under uncertainty. We find that organizations can
only effectively control the level of their salespeople’s
CSB if they align the level of information provision
with the different dimensions of perceived risk in a
new product selling situation.
Finally, we bridge new product selling literature and per-
sonnel evaluation studies in the human resource domain. The
majority of new product selling studies consider sales perfor-
mance as the number of products sold (e.g., Fu et al. 2009;
Hultink and Atuahene-Gima 2000). However, less objective
elements such as the level of effort a manager perceives from a
salesperson also play an important role in promotion decisions
(Harris et al. 2014). We consider an objective measure of new
product selling performance as well as the managerial evalu-
ation of a salesperson’s performance and show that CSB
makes the effort to sell new products a stronger driver of
objective performance, but a weaker driver of the managerial
overall evaluation of the salesperson.
We build and test a conceptual model by employing
a multi-step approach, drawing on multiple data sources.
First, we conducted exploratory research with 32 em-
ployees from 15 high-tech companies to ground our
hypothesized relationships and to help develop CSB’s
operationalization. Second, we tested the CSB scale
using survey data from 172 salespeople (Sample 1)
working for a global ICT company. Third, we confirmed
the psychometric properties of CSB relative to related
concepts using data from 191 salespeople (Sample 2) of
a commercially available panel of B2B salespeople.
Fourth, we tested our hypotheses using survey data
from Sample 1. Fifth, we demonstrated the suitability
of Sample 1 and the generalizability of our findings
through descriptive meta-analytic triangulation. Finally,
we augmented the data from Sample 1 with secondary
market data to demonstrate the robustness of our find-
ings across different market contexts and conditions.
Next, we describe our conceptual framework and model.
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Theoretical background
Theoretical foundations of conservative selling behavior
Central to our study is the concept of conservatism, which
finds its roots in the Greek word conservare, meaning Bto
keep,^ Bto preserve,^ or Bto retain.^ Psychology, sociology,
economics, and political science research presents conserva-
tism in various ways, including as an individual behav-
ior, a personality trait, an attitude, a business strategy,
or a social/cultural norm (Jost et al. 2003; Wilson
2013). Individuals’ conservatism associates with avoid-
ance of cognitive complexity, a lower willingness to
deviate from social convention, and a desire for stable
beliefs as opposed to uncertainty (Jost et al. 2003).
We focus on conservative behavior, which entails
conducting known courses of action before engaging in new
and unknown activities when making decisions under risk. A
useful lens for studying such behavior is provided by literature
on perceived risk processing, which describes how individuals
perceive risk and consequently make behavioral decisions
(Conchar et al. 2004). Risk reflects the extent to which there
is uncertainty about realizing potentially significant and/or
disappointing outcomes of decisions.
An important assumption in perceived risk processing lit-
erature is that human decision makers are risk averse. The
more outcome uncertainty surrounding a behavioral choice,
the more likely individuals prefer less uncertain options.
Although most sales studies also assume salespersons to be
risk averse, risk aversion is seldom operationalized. We pro-
vide a more detailed and practical perspective.
CSB and related concepts
CSB represents a sales domain–specific behavioral represen-
tation of risk aversion and is defined as the extent to which a
salesperson maximizes selling efforts for existing products
before engaging in efforts to sell the new product. CSB de-
scribes the order in which salespeople sell products from their
portfolio. Rather than making a one-time choice in selling an
existing or a new product, salespeople may change their prod-
uct preference (and accompanying pitch) along the sales pro-
cess. CSB may even act as a deliberate strategy to reduce
customer objections.
CSB shares conceptual territory with related con-
cepts; Table 1 provides a comprehensive overview.
Extant research on salesperson behavior during the sale
of new products mainly focuses on effort or its varia-
tions. For instance, selling (or working) hard reflects the
amount of time spent in trying to achieve sales goals
(Rapp et al. 2006). New product adoption is an interac-
tion of selling effort and commitment to the new prod-
uct (Kuester et al. 2016). New product selling intentions
precede effortful behavior and capture a salesperson’s
willingness to try hard in selling new products (Fu
et al. 2010). CSB differs from these concepts in that it
specifically accounts for the temporal ordering of selling
new and existing products. Salespeople may invest
much effort in selling the new product, but only after
they have explored the options to sell the existing prod-
uct. CSB also accounts for the fact that salespeople do
not need to be positive or negative about the new prod-
uct. This is an implicit premise of studies on effort-
related concepts though.
Adaptive (or smart) selling is another related concept. This
reflects a salesperson’s capacity to plan and execute a wide
range of selling behaviors and activities based on situational
considerations (Sujan et al. 1994). Unfortunately, most studies
on adaptive selling consider the skill of adaptation but do not
focus on specific alterations in selling behaviors or activities.
CSB specifically suggests that the order of new and existing
product selling may be such an adaptation.
Finally, two concepts in the new product selling litera-
ture specifically account for the trade-offs or complemen-
tarities between new and existing product selling. First,
product selling ambidexterity holds that selling new and
existing products can be balanced over time through al-
teration of activities (Van der Borgh et al. 2015). Studies
on ambidexterity do not discuss the order of selling that
leads to this balance. Because salespeople have to decide
in each encounter which product to present to customers
first, CSB provides a more informative lens on salespeo-
ple’s trade-offs than product selling ambidexterity.
Second, cross- and up-selling behaviors reflect selling ad-
ditional items to customers who have previously pur-
chased one or more item(s) (Kamakura 2008). Such sales
behaviors are usually successful because salespeople have
a foot-in-the-door with these customers. CSB may influ-
ence sales outcomes through similar principles but does
not require a history of purchase to take effect.
Later, we continue to distinguish CSB from these
concepts in our empirical analysis. Next, we build our
conceptual model.
Conceptual development
Perceived risk processing theory
We build on perceived risk processing theory to derive CSB’s
antecedents. The theory posits that individuals go through
three phases when they have to make product choices that
involve risk: risk assessment, risk framing, and risk evalua-
tion. In the first phase individuals perceive five dimensions of
risk that ultimately influence their product choice: perfor-
mance risk (i.e., chance that product does not produce desired
J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci.
Table 1 Concepts related to conservative selling behavior
Effort to sell new products /
Hard selling
New product adoption Adaptive / Smart selling
Definition BThe amount of time, activity or
persistence of the salesperson in
selling the focal new product^
(Atuahene-Gima and Micheal
1998, p. 906)
BThe interaction between the degree
to which [salespeople] accept and
internalize the goals of a new
product (i.e., commitment) and the
extent to which they work smart and
hard (i.e., effort) to achieve these
goals^(Atuahene-Gima 1997, p. 500)
BEngaging in planning to determine
the suitability of sales behaviors and
activities that will be undertaken, the
capacity to engage in a wide range
of selling behaviors and activities,
and the alteration of sales behaviors
and activities in keeping with
situational considerations^




Salesperson’s perception of the new
product (Ahearne et al. 2010);
Assigned goals, self-set goals,
self-efficacy (Fu et al. 2009);
Salesperson motivation and
ability (Johnson and Sohi 2016)
Expected customer demand, sales
manager adoption (brand adoption;
Wieseke et al. 2008); Salesforce
integration (Kuester et al. 2016)
Experience, knowledge, empowering




Customer’s perception of the new
product (Ahearne et al. 2010);
Satisfaction in selling new product,
performance in selling new product
(Atuahene-Gima and Micheal 1998);
New product sales (Fu et al. 2009);
Implementation success
(of new product selling strategy)
(Johnson and Sohi 2016)
Selling performance (Hultink and
Atuahene-Gima 2000);
New product success
(Kuester et al. 2016)
Customer service, performance




Effort does not consider the order of
selling new and existing products
during and across sales encounters.
Although salespeople may invest a
lot of effort to sell new products, they
may do that only after they have
explored the options to sell existing
products, i.e., after displaying CSB.
Adoption combines an attitude and a
behavioral construct, thereby assuming
that a salesperson both needs to accept the
new product and put effort in its sales
processes to be successful in selling the
product. CSB does not require a positive
attitude toward the new product. Adoption
also disregards the aspect of timing, i.e.,
when to exert effort? CSB covers this
aspect.
Smart and adaptive selling suggest that
the degree to which salespeople alter
their sales presentation to the nature
of the sales situation increases overall
sales performance, but these concepts
do not show how salespeople (should)
adapt their presentation. CSB specifically
suggests that the order of new and existing
product selling may be such an adaptation.
New product selling intentions Product selling ambidexterity Cross- and up-selling
Definition B[I]ntentions serve as an indicator of
how hard people are willing to try
and how much effort they are
willing to exert over time to
perform a specific behavior (Ajzen
1991)^ (Fu et al. 2010, p. 64)
BSalesperson ambidextrous selling behaviour
as consisting of two
separate constructs [selling new
and selling existing products] that probably
trade off […] and […]
pursued alternately (i.e. through
temporal separation)^
(Van der Borgh et al. 2015)
Cross-selling is Bsales of additional
items related (or sometimes
unrelated) to a previously purchased
item, while up-selling involves the
increase of order volume either by the sales
of more units of the same
purchased item, or the upgrading into
a more expensive version of the




Self-efficacy, attitude toward selling
the new product, subjective norms
(Fu et al. 2010); Product
innovativeness, customer newness
(Fu et al. 2008)
Manager orientation, organizational















Growth rate of new product sales
(Fu et al. 2010); New product
performance (Fu et al. 2008)
Selling performance (Van der Borgh et al.
2015); Customer satisfaction, sales
performance, efficiency (Jasmand et al.
2012); profit margins (DeCarlo and Lam
2016)
Cross-selling performance
(Schmitz 2013; Schmitz et al. 2014)
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outcomes), social risk (i.e., chance that product affects the way
others think of individual), financial risk (i.e., chance that
product involves losing money), psychological risk (i.e.,
chance that product does not fit well with self-concept), and
physical risk (i.e., chance that product causes health injury)
(Jacoby and Kaplan 1972; Mitchell 1999). In contrast to the
first three risk dimensions, psychological risk and physical
risk may be salient for some products (e.g., popular brands,
luxury goods, food or health products), but are absent for most
other products (Labrecque et al. 2016).
In the risk framing phase, individuals Bsort and filter infor-
mational cues that will enable them to handle or reduce per-
ceived risk^ (Conchar et al. 2004, p. 427). Such information
processing determines the relative importance of each risk
dimension in an individual’s choice process. Mass media,
managers, friends, or researchers may (de)emphasize one or
more risk dimensions in individuals’ decisions through acti-
vating particular connections or associations in their
cognitions―a process called priming. For instance, Mandel
(2003) shows that instructing individuals to think about family
and friends makes social risk more salient than financial risk
in behavioral decisions.
In the last phase, risk evaluation, individuals decide on
whether to make a risky choice or not. Individuals Bmanage
the consequences of perceived risk through a process of men-
tal accounting […] that constitutes perceived-risk evaluation^
(Conchar et al. 2004, p. 431). In general, the larger the per-
ceived risk, the larger the threat to extant wealth and the less
likely individuals make the risky choice. However, individ-
uals also weigh the risk dimensions as potential losses against
evaluation standards, specifically their initial asset levels (e.g.,
past investments) and trait-based personality characteristics
such as self-confidence (Mitchell 1999; Wiseman and
Gomez-Mejia 1998).
Perceived risks in new product selling
Although perceived risk processing theory originates in con-
sumer research, several works extend the theory to an
organizational context and outline managerially-relevant fac-
tors that make up individual’s perceived risk dimensions in
organizational settings (e.g., Sitkin and Pablo 1992;
Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998). We build on these studies
to define the elements in the perceived risk processing frame-
work and employ a qualitative study to ground our concepts
and hypothesized relationships. Specifically, we interviewed
32 employees from 15 high-tech companies.1 All employees
had a role in new product development and launchwithin their
respective companies. Functions included salespeople and
their managers, R&D managers, product engineers, and
marketers.
We first consider the perceived risk dimensions that sales-
people rely on during risk assessment: performance, social,
and financial risks. In our study context, psychological and
physical risk dimensions are less of a concern because the
newly introduced products do not pose risk to a salesperson’s
health or self-identity (cf. Labrecque et al. 2016).
A salesperson’s uncertainty to what extent effort spent in
the sales process will result in closing deals is largely a func-
tion of the (un)familiarity of the product to the decision maker
and other stakeholders (Sitkin and Pablo 1992). One of the
fundamental challenges in new product selling is new product
radicalness: the extent to which the new product is perceived
to be inconsistent with the systems, needs, and norms already
adopted by the business customer (Micheal et al. 2003). As an
R&Dmanager from an automotive company said: BOur sales-
people are really good in selling simple vehicles […] But
when they have to explain an innovative vehicle with four
independent axes and all configurational options, the pitch
becomes more complex because the customer does not under-
stand the product.^ New product radicalness directly affects
the chance that a salesperson can attain the desired perfor-
mance outcomes and thus embodies the performance risk a
salesperson perceives.
In addition, managers model risk behavior and lend
their personal legitimacy to the taking or avoiding of risks
1 More information about the design and descriptives of the qualitative study is





Intention is a psychological state that
indicates that a salesperson is willing
to sell the new product. However, it
does not necessarily translate into
actual behavior. In addition, intentions
may capture a willingness to try and
exert effort over time to perform a
specific behavior (Ajzen 1991), but it
does not capture the temporal ordering
of (selling) activities. CSB does.
Salesperson product-selling ambidexterity
and CSB are related but different concepts.
While both reflect situations in which new
and existing products are sold, product
selling ambidexterity focuses on the
degree of balancing both types of products in
selling activities, while CSB focuses on the
order of presentation. CSB is thus a more
fine-grained perspective on product selling
ambidexterity.
Cross- and up-selling literature holds that the
successive sale of an additional product after
an initial successful sale is easier because
of an increased commitment through a
foot-in-the-door with the customer. CSB’s
effect on sales performance partially relies on
the same logic but CSB does not require a
past sale to be effective.
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of their subordinates (Sitkin and Pablo 1992) through
their selling orientations. A sales manager from an origi-
nal equipment manufacturer indicated: BIn contrast to
more transactional selling situations where sales priorities
are communicated company-wide, our complex B2B sell-
ing environment requires that I assume an important role
in guiding salespeople on how to proceed with the selling
task.^ We thus focus on managerial new product
orientation, which reflects to what extent salespeople per-
ceive managerial practices, actions, and directives that
guide employees’ attention, time, and effort toward the
sale of new products in the firm’s product portfolio.
Employees align their behavior with leader orientations to
minimize potential risks while maximizing benefits with re-
spect to pay, promotions, and job assignments (e.g., Detert and
Burris 2007). Not surprisingly, a salesperson who acts in line
with managerial preferences generally is evaluated favorably
by his/her manager (Podsakoff and Mackenzie 1994). In con-
trast, a salesperson who does not follow the dominant selling
orientation generally is evaluated critically by his/her manag-
er. The stronger a manager’s new product selling orientation,
the more clearly employees perceive a strategic prioritization
of selling goals, and the more convinced they become that
deviating from working toward these goals changes the way
their manager thinks about and evaluates them. We thus see
managerial new product orientation as the key indicator of
social risk.
Organizations also channel employees’ risk assess-
ments through monitoring and rewards (Sitkin and Pablo
1992). In B2B settings managers typically find them-
selves unable to set specific rewards for new products
because they cannot make an accurate estimation of the
true customer demand for new offerings (Schöttner 2016).
Moreover, installing new product-specific incentives in-
creases the chance that salespeople push new products
that customers do not need or want. Rather than linking
salary and bonuses to new product sales volume, firms
typically install long-term reward systems, as put by an
R&D manager from a logistics company: BWe motivate
our salespeople to take a long-term perspective that aligns
with our strategic objectives.^ Long-term rewards lower
the perceived financial risks associated with selling new
products because they provide more leeway for salespeo-
ple to obtain their targets (Wei and Atuahene-Gima 2009).
We thus regard long-term rewards as the key indicator of
perceived financial risk and define them as incentives that
aim to facilitate the achievement of various long-term ob-
jectives and specified strategic goals in a time frame of
longer than one year.
We also examine the important role of external information
during salespeople’s risks processing. New product
information typically comes to salespeople in aggregated form
and is centrally coordinated, as described by a manufacturing
company product manager: BOur salespeople really need to be
convinced about the added value of new products, how they
address the problems and needs of their customers. We invest
a lot of resources and time in away days, workshops, training,
information meetings, drinks, exclusive trips, et cetera.^
Managers expect that salespeople become less conservative
because information lowers perceived risk through clarifying
how the new product benefits customers and Bsignaling^ the
company’s commitment to the new product (Erdem and Swait
1998). However, in accordance with perceived risk processing
theory, we do not posit a direct but a moderating effect of new
product information as it influences how employees act on
their perceived risk dimensions (Conchar et al. 2004).
Finally, we account for three categories of evaluation
standards that previous perceived risk processing studies
have outlined. First, individual preferences toward risk are
captured in self-confidence (Conchar et al. 2004; Mitchell
1999) , company tenure (Wang 2015) , and past
performance (Sitkin and Pablo 1992). These factors pro-
vide an individual with evidence from past or enduring
abilities to overcome obstacles and therefore drive indi-
viduals to accept risks that others would avoid (Wiseman
and Gomez-Mejia 1998). Second, people are more or less
likely to take risk as a function of their past investments
and resultant current asset levels; individuals with more
favorable current assets are more likely to avoid risky
choices (Conchar et al. 2004). We thus consider a
salesperson’s pay scale and customer relationship quality
(i.e., the salesperson’s perceptions of his/her customers’
trust in, satisfaction with, and commitment to him/her)
to represent past investments and achievements within
the company and its customer base, respectively. Third,
individual risk taking depends on whether problems are
presented as gains or losses (Kahneman and Tversky
1979). In our context, a radically new product may also
offer much value to customers. We define new product
advantage as the salesperson’s perception of product su-
periority relative to existing products with respect to qual-
ity, cost-benefit ratio, or technological innovativeness, and
account for the possibility that such perceptions may af-
fect risk behavior.
In sum, Fig. 1 presents our conceptual model. We describe
our hypotheses next.
Hypotheses
Perceived risk dimensions in risk assessment
Perceived performance risk Compared to new products that
contain familiar features and benefits, radically new products
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that associate with changes in a customer’s established usage
patterns and habits carry a high performance risk for salespeo-
ple. There is more uncertainty as to whether the customer will
adopt the new product (Atuahene-Gima 1997), and standard-
ized sales procedures do not suit radically new products; these
require intense, tailored sales efforts (Song and Montoya-
Weiss 1998). The selling process of radically new products
will thus be perceived as more complex than the selling pro-
cess of less radically new products. As salespeople strive to
maximize their performance through the path of least resis-
tance (Allcott and Sweeney 2016), new product radicalness
makes salespeople more likely to delay their engagement in
risky sales choices and first expend effort to sell an existing
product. We therefore hypothesize:
H1: New product radicalness is positively related to CSB.
Perceived social risk For salespeople, their sales manager is
influential because of his or her formal status, personal con-
tact, and pivotal role in individuals’ overall performance eval-
uations (Wieseke et al. 2008). Salespeople interpret manage-
rial orientations through an iterative process of receiving
inputs, acting upon demands, and adjusting their behavior
due to the feedback received (Schneider et al. 2003). The
stronger a manager’s new product orientation, the more clear-
ly employees perceive strong expectations to explore new
sales routines and to accept the chance of failure. In fact,
salespeople know that not engaging in the risky choice of
selling new products will change how a sales manager thinks
about them. To avoid this high social risk, salespeople are
more likely to first explore new product selling options rather
than trying to sell customers an existing product. We therefore
hypothesize:
H2: Managerial new product orientation is negatively
related to CSB.
Perceived financial risk Long-term rewards communicate
to salespeople the importance of realizing the firm’s long-
term revenue growth and taking a long-term perspective
in responding to customers’ needs and wants (Wei and
Atuahene-Gima 2009). Compared to short-term rewards
such as order intake targets, long-term rewards carry less
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Fig. 1 Hypothesized model
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of personal underperforming, a sales rep has many occa-
sions to restore his or her contribution to revenue growth
and receive the sales reward. The lower perceived finan-
cial risk makes it more likely that salespeople make sell-
ing the new product their first choice in sales cycles, es-
pecially because they understand that Bnew products con-
stitute the lifeblood of long-term firm success^ (Mullins
et al. 1999, p. 282). In contrast, short-term rewards pres-
surize salespeople to pursue immediate outcomes, which
are perceived to be more easily attained by prioritizing
proven sellers over complex new offerings (Ahearne
et al. 2010). We therefore hypothesize:
H3: Long-term rewards are negatively related to CSB.
New product information as risk-framing mechanism
An individual’s risk perceptions, information processing,
and risky choice are inextricably linked (e.g., Conchar
et al. 2004; Dowling and Staelin 1994). In this nomolog-
ical network the information available to decision makers
determines the relative weight of the perceived risk di-
mensions through a process of cognitive priming
(Mandel 2003). Priming an individual with a specific in-
formation cue creates cognitive activation tags. When in-
dividuals assess risky choice situations, the perceived risk
dimensions have to Bmake contact with one of the tags
left earlier and find an intersection^ (Collins and Loftus
1975, p. 409). These intersections are easily available
and retrievable at the time a risky decision has to be
made and thereby affect the weight of perceived risk
dimensions in an individual’s choice (Mandel 2003;
Scheufele and Tewksbury 2007).
The dimension that most closely corresponds to the
primed information becomes more important relative to
other dimensions. New product information specifically
addresses how the new product and its features satisfy
customer needs. Rather than stressing social or financial
elements in risky situations, managers provide new prod-
uct information in an effort to reassure salespeople that
the product will perform well in the market (Atuahene-
Gima 1997). It therefore appeals to the salesperson’s per-
ception of performance risk. Providing new product infor-
mation to salespeople will strengthen the relationship be-
tween perceived performance risk and CSB and weaken
the relationships of perceived social risk and perceived
financial risk with CSB. Hence, we expect that new prod-
uct radicalness will become a more important antecedent
and managerial new product orientation and long-term
rewards become less important antecedents of CSB.
Formally:
H4: New product information (a) strengthens the relation-
ship between new product radicalness and CSB, and
weakens the relationships (b) between managerial new
product orientation and CSB and (c) between long-term
rewards and CSB.
Risk evaluation outcomes: CSB’s performance
consequences
Previous research has convincingly demonstrated that
higher levels of salesperson’s effort to sell new products
leads to positive performance outcomes (Johnson and
Sohi 2016). Reasons include that a high level of effort
conveys to customers the value of the product and the
salesperson’s confidence in the product (Ahearne et al.
2010) and being more persistent helps overcome occa-
sional setbacks and thus closing deals (Fu et al. 2009).
Effort to sell new products also positively relates to a
manager’s overall performance evaluation, as it signifies
that salespeople are willing to go the extra mile and do
not refrain from engaging in difficult selling tasks.
Harris et al. (2014) even report that sales managers
may prefer hard work and productivity over a
salesperson’s intentions to satisfy customer needs.
Although disconcerting from a marketing point of view,
it shows the importance of salesperson effort in mana-
gerial evaluations of their subordinates’ performance.
When salespeople display CSB and thus delay their
efforts to sell the new product during and across customer
encounters, the resources remaining for intensively selling
the new product in the end are more limited because of
the shorter time period available. In addition, people re-
vising their initial choice from a set of options need some
time to recalibrate because of cognitive processes such as
dissonance, rationalization, anticipated regret, or inertia
(Hoch 2002). Salespeople who (have to) switch their sell-
ing efforts from existing to new products may therefore
only grudgingly accept their new strategy. Their overall
effort to sell new products will therefore be lower. In sum,
we expect that effort to sell new products will mediate
between CSB and performance outcomes. Formally:
H5: Effort mediates the relationship between CSB and per-
formance outcomes such that (a) CSB negatively relates
to effort to sell new products, and effort to sell new
products positively relates to (b) managerial overall
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performance evaluation and (c) new product selling
performance.
Salespeople are rational actors who allocate their cognitive
and physical resources across a portfolio of products in a way
that maximizes overall performance (Ahearne et al. 2010).
This implies that they may plan and organize their selling
activities in a way that makes sales efforts more effective
(Allcott and Sweeney 2016; Rapp et al. 2006). One approach
for salespeople to structure their selling activities is to
change the order in which different products from the
product portfolio are presented to the customer. We thus
posit that conservative selling can be a strategy that
combines with effort to sell new products to affect a
salesperson’s performance outcomes.2
First, we expect that CSB dampens the positive rela-
tionship between effort to sell new products and overall
managerial performance evaluation. Managers assess
their subordinates by judging the degree to which a
salesperson matches their ideal of a Bgood salesperson.^
This is typically reflected in high effort and productivity
(Harris et al. 2014). When launching new products,
managers expect this effort to be enduring because
salespeople need to open up a new market by informing
and educating customers about how the new product
may address customer needs and problems (Fu et al.
2010). When salespeople first focus on selling existing
products and delay their effort to sell the new product
till the late stages of sales cycles, managers will feel
that their employees had the chance to put in more
effort to sell the new product but did not take this
opportunity. Additional effort that employees put into
selling new products after a period of conservatism thus
translates less strongly into managerial evaluations. In
contrast, when salespeople expend effort in selling new
products throughout the sales cycle, managers may feel
that employees constantly took initiative and were com-
petitive in selling new products (Pettijohn et al. 2001).
Because the sales activities of such employees lack a
period where no effort was expended on selling the
new product, managers are less likely to think that more
effort could have been put in. Each additional unit of
effort is then appreciated more because managers feel
that employees may have reached their cognitive and
physical limits and now go the extra mile.
Second, we expect that CSB strengthens the positive rela-
tionship between effort to sell new products and new product
selling performance. Because CSB indicates the extent to
which a salesperson maximizes selling efforts for existing
products before engaging in efforts to sell the new product,
customers likely experience a sequential presentation of prod-
ucts in a sales cycle with a salesperson who acts conservative-
ly. Literature supports the notion that new products become
more attractive when presented following existing products.
For instance, sales literature in consumer settings suggests that
foot-in-the-door techniques can help lower initial resistance to
adopt because in their strive for consistent responses, cus-
tomers agreeing to a small initial request are more likely to
comply with a larger or riskier request (Cialdini and
Guadagno 2004). Sequential presentation also makes a new
product look more attractive to a customer; compared to an
existing product, each additional feature of a new product may
add desired capabilities and thus provide the customer with
another reason to purchase (Thompson et al. 2005). This
makes the effort spent on selling the new product more effec-
tive. In sum, we posit:
H6: CSB moderates the relationship between effort to sell
new products and performance outcomes, such that
CSB (a) weakens the positive effect of effort to sell
new products on managerial overall performance eval-
uation and (b) strengthens the positive effect of effort to
sell new products on new product selling performance.
Method
Research context and data collection
Following our qualitative grounding discussed earlier,
for Sample 1 we gathered data from a global ICT com-
pany that operates in 90 countries and is representative
of B2B selling contexts as (1) new products are intro-
duced annually, (2) new products are complex and break
from existing offerings, (3) the salesforce organization is
unit-based, and (4) selling is a relational rather than a
transactional activity. The company’s product portfolio
consists of workspace management systems, connectivi-
ty solutions, and datacenters, among others. Such prod-
ucts have a relatively short life cycle.
The company’s sales force focuses on a set of approximate-
ly 500 business customers in industries such as finance,
2 From a methodological perspective, we note that previous research points
out that the independent variable can also act as a moderator of the mediating
effect (Preacher et al. 2007). In such cases the independent variable produces
its effect in part by changing the mediating process that normally produces the
outcome (Judd and Kenny 1981). In our case it is expected that CSB changes
the way in which other stakeholders (i.e., managers and customers) perceive
high levels of effort, thereby leading to different outcomes.
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government, education, transport, and retail. At the time of
study, the company had just introduced several new solutions
that required significant changes in customers’ work process-
es. The radicalness of these solutions differed across sectors;
not every sector faced equally substantial changes to their
work processes. The new products immediately entered
the salespeople’s product portfolios and accounted for a
substantial portion of the company’s total annual reve-
nue (28%). Sales units received collective briefings and
training about the new product’s features, value propo-
sition, and link with customer needs.
We collected data from three sources at different points in
time. We asked all 244 salespeople and their 31 managers,
organized in 31 sales units, to complete a questionnaire.
After two reminders, sent over a three-week period, we re-
ceived 172 responses from salespeople (70.5% response rate)
and 31 responses from managers (100% response rate). All
units sampled featured at least 3 responding salespeople. Six
months after collecting the questionnaire data, we obtained
performance data from company records.
Measures
With minor wording adjustments to enhance the applicability
of some items, most of our constructs could be operationalized
with scales validated in previous work. However, because
CSB is a new concept, we carefully considered its
operationalization. Following our review of relevant literature
and general qualitative grounding, we interviewed four sales
managers of our focal company and asked them to reflect on
their experiences with new product launches in the salesforce
and what actions they typically associate with salesperson
conservatism. The managers consistently mentioned elements
such as being cautious, sticking to existing sales routines, and
preferring to maximize the potential of proven sellers first.
Based on the managers’ input and studies on political (e.g.,
Jost et al. 2003) and accounting (e.g., Watts 2003) conserva-
tism, we developed an item pool. We conducted industry-
specific investigations to define the average product life cycle
and sales process duration. As a result, items referred to Bnew
products^ when those were introduced in the 12 months pre-
ceding the questionnaire. The initial pool of items was then
refined based on further in-depth interviews with the sales
managers, their salespeople, and their sales support staff.
Next, we constructed a draft questionnaire and pretested it
with six company employees and two industry experts.
Following the pretests, we made minor wording adjustments
to enhance the applicability of the items. The resulting scale
consists of three items.
Table 2 contains the scale items for our measures. All re-
sponses were recorded on five-point Likert scales with 1
(Bstrongly disagree^) and 5 (Bstrongly agree^) as anchors.
To assess new product information, sales managers completed
four items adapted from Low and Mohr (2001) to indicate the
extent to which the salespeople in their unit received timely,
relevant, and accurate information on how new products ad-
dress customer needs. It is therefore a unit-level measure.
The salesperson questionnaire included managerial new
product orientation, measured with five items from Van der
Borgh and Schepers (2014). Long-term rewards was
measured with three items adopted from Wei and
Atuahene-Gima (2009) such that a low score on these
items indicate a focus on short-term rewards. New prod-
uct radicalness was measured using a four-item scale
developed by Langerak et al. (2008), and effort to sell
new products was based on work by Sujan et al. (1994)
and Hultink and Atuahene-Gima (2000).
New product selling performancewas taken from company
records and reflects for each salesperson the sales volume
generated from the sale of new products as a percentage of
his/her overall sales volume.Managerial overall performance
evaluation was also collected from company records as we
were given access to an aggregate measure of managers’ for-
mal evaluations of each salesperson’s overall functioning. Sub
dimensions tapped into individual performance in terms of
output and behavior and included questions as BThis salesper-
son obtained revenue targets for his or her customers,^ BThis
salesperson sticks to the company’s formal rules and
regulations,^ and BThis salesperson contributes to the
company’s success.^ For each employee, the aggregated score
indicated a Bpoor^ (1) to Bexcellent^ (5) evaluation.
We controlled for the evaluation standards that salespeople
may use in their risk evaluation phase. Specifically, we mea-
sured self-confidence with one item from Riggs and Knight
(1994). In addition, company tenure (i.e., years with the firm),
past performance (i.e., order intake target obtained on all
products in previous year), and pay scale (i.e., a market-
based salary structure dividing sales people in different
levels of salary relative to the market) were obtained from
company databases. Customer relationship quality was
measured with four items from Palmatier (2008), and
new product advantage was measured using a four-item
scale developed by Langerak et al. (2008).
Analyses
Analytical approach
Because salespeople were nested within sales units, responses
from salespeople of the same unit may be interdependent. To
determine whether we should explicitly account for multiple
levels in our analyses, we examined the intraclass correlation
coefficients (ICC) for the variables in our model; ICCs ranged
from .025 to .176. Even small ICC values (e.g., .05) indicate
that researchers should control for dependence of observations
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to prevent considerable bias in the results (Cohen et al. 2003,
p. 538). We thus accounted for the multilevel structure of our
data and estimated a multilevel structural equation model
(MSEM) with Mplus 7.11 software (Muthén and Muthén
2012). Compared to regression-based multilevel approaches,
MSEMhas the advantage not to conflate within- and between-
group effects. MSEM separates the effects using latent vari-
ables at both levels and thereby accounts for measurement
error (Preacher et al. 2010).
Finally, we obtained a relatively small sample and set out to
test moderated and mediated effects that are non-normally
distributed. Given these conditions we employed Bayesian
methods because these provide more reliable estimations on
small samples (Muthén and Asparouhov 2012) and do not
assume or require normal distributions for the model parame-
ters (Zhang et al. 2009).
Measurement model analysis
To test whether the data fit the hypothesized measurement
model, we conducted a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA)
that accounted for the non-identification problem that may
occur with small sample sizes (i.e., the CFA is Bayesian)
and that considered the nested nature of our data (i.e., the
CFA is multi-level). Table 2 reports the results.3
To determine the Bayesian CFA model fit, we examined
the posterior predictive p (ppp) value. Our BCFA showed a
ppp-value of .862, which indicated a good fit between the
model and the data. One cross-loading (λNPA, npr_1 = .198)
and four residual covariances (σnpo_3,npo_4 = −.129;
σltr_1,ltr_3 = −.149; σeff_2,eff_3 = .055; σeff_4,eff_5 = .075) were
found significant, which warrants the use of Bayesian estima-
tion techniques (i.e., subscript capitals indicate latent
constructs, lower case indicates items. Please refer to
Tables 2 and 3 for details on the acronyms).
All items loaded on their respective factors with substantial
values, and no serious cross-loadings (i.e., > .3) were ob-
served. Table 3 shows that the scales also achieved sufficient
reliability, with Cronbach’s alphas varying between .73 and
.93 and composite reliabilities varying between .82 and .94.
Average variances extracted (AVE) exceeded .50 for each
construct, in support of convergent validity. The con-
structs also displayed discriminant validity because the
AVE of each construct exceeded the average variance
shared with any other construct.
We evaluated the validity of our CSB concept and scale in
Sample 1 using a second dataset (Sample 2) obtained from a
commercially available panel of 191 B2B salespeople. The
CSB scale again displayed desirable psychometric properties
and satisfied the criteria for discriminant validity versus relat-
ed concepts. Appendix A provides more detail.
Structural model analysis
We tested our hypothesized model using Sample 1 and took a
stepwise approach. In the first step, we included the control
variables and our hypothesized direct effects (Model 1). In the
second step, we specified and added the interaction effects of
unit-level new product information (Model 2). We standard-
ized all independent variables before creating the product
terms to enable model convergence and facilitate the interpre-
tation of the coefficients without altering the underlying data.
Thus, we obtained the following multilevel equations:
CSBij ¼ γ00 þ γ10NPOij þ γ20LTRij þ γ30NPRij þ γ01NPI j
þ γ40 NPOij  NPI j
 
ij þ γ50 LTRij  NPI j
 
ij
þ γ60 NPRij  NPI j
 
ij þ γ70TENij þ γ80PPij
þ γ90PAYij þ γ100CRQij þ γ110NPAij þ γ120SCFij
þ u0 j þ eij
ð1Þ
EFFij ¼ α00 þ α10NPOij þ α20LTRij þ α30NPRij
þ α40CSBij þ α01NPI j þ α80TENij þ α90PPij
þ α100PAYij þ α110CRQij þ α120NPAij
þ γ130SCFij þ π0 j þ εij
ð2Þ
SPOij ¼ θ00 þ θ10CSBij þ θ20EFFij
þ θ40 CSBij  EFF j
 
ij þ θ70TENij þ θ80PPij
þ θ90PAYij þ θ100CRQij þ θ110NPAij
þ γ120SCFij þ μ0hj þ ϵhij
ð3Þ
SPOij indicates salesperson performance outcome for salesper-
son i of unit j, other acronyms are explained in Table 3.
Furthermore, γ00, α 00, and θ00 are intercepts; γ10... θ110 are
regression coefficients; eij, εij, and ϵij, are individual-level error
3 Consistent with Muthén and Asparouhov (2012), our CFA employed an
inverse-Wishart prior, IW(I, df) with df = p + 6 = 35, which corresponds to
prior means and standard deviations for residual covariances of 0 and .01,
respectively. Thus, we specified informative priors for cross-loadings with
the prior distributions N(0, .01). To reduce any auto-correlation problems
among Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) iterations, we used a thinning
of 10 with a total of 100,000 iterations to describe the posterior distributions.
We relied on a burn-in of 50,000 draws to reach a stationary posterior distri-
bution. We confirmed the convergence of the Gibbs sampling by examining
the trace plot of the Markov chains and the Gelman-Rubin potential scale
reduction statistic (PSR). The posterior parameter draws indicated conver-
gence and stability after hundreds of draws (i.e., PSR < 1.002). To assess
whether our Bayesian procedure affected the outcomes of the CFA, we ran
an alternative maximum likelihood CFA. Results indicated a consistent pattern
of items loadings.
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terms; and uoj, πoj, and μoj are unique variations of unit j from the
intercept (i.e.,γ00,α 00, and θ00), after partialling out the effects of
all unit-level regression coefficients (i.e., γ01, α 01). We then
proceeded with our Bayesian estimation procedure.4
Results
Antecedents of CSB
Tables 4a and 4b displays the results of the estimations of our
two models. Model 2 explained significantly more variation
than Model 1. In support of H1, we found a direct positive
effect of new product radicalness on CSB (CI95% = [.02; .31]).
The results also confirm H2, as the effect of managerial new
4 For the Bayesian estimator we assumed normal N(0, 104) prior distributions
for all regression coefficients and inverse gamma IG(10−3, 10−3) prior distri-
butions for the variance parameters. Similar to the Bayesian CFA procedure,
we used a total of 100,000 iterations, a burn-in of 50,000 draws, a thinning of
10, and confirmed the convergence and stability of the iterations by examining
trace plots and potential scale reduction (PSR) statistics.
Table 2 Main construct scale measures and factor loadings
Construct / item Factor
loading
New product information (adopted from Low and Mohr 2001)
[Manager rated] Please consider the new products X, Y, and Z that were introduced in the product portfolio of the sales team you
supervised during the past 12 months and answer the following statements.
1 The new product information communicated about customer needs was very reliable. (npi_1) .85
2 The provided new product information included important details about customer needs. (npi_2) .90
3 The new product information provided was accurate. (npi_3) .94
4 The new product information was provided in a timely manner. (npi_4) .86
New product radicalness (adopted from Langerak et al. 2008)
The new products of [company]…
1 involve high change over costs for my customers. (npr_1) .56
2 are difficult for my customers to understand or evaluate. (npr_2) .75
3 take my customers time to really understand their advantages. (npr_3) .81
4 require advance planning by my customers. (npr_4) .74
Managerial new product orientation (adopted from Van der Borgh and Schepers 2014)
My sales manager wants us to devote our time and attention primarily to. . .
1 the selling of new products and services in our assortment. (npo_1) .81
2 the development of a sales argument for the new products and services. (npo_2) .89
3 experimenting with the selling tactics for the new products and services. (npo_3) .80
4 the utilization of new selling opportunities for new products. (npo_4) .71
5 spot new, rising needs of customers. (npo_5) .55
Long-term rewards (adopted from Wei and Atuahene-Gima 2009)
1 I am strongly motivated by the pay system to take a long-term orientation (e.g., revenue growth). (ltr_1) .87
2 Our pay policies make it possible to achieve long-term (1 or more years) goals. (ltr_2) .90
3 Our pay policies make me keenly aware that long-term results (e.g., revenue growth) are more important than short-term results (e.g.,
order intake). (ltr_3)
.84
Effort to sell new products (based on Sujan et al. 1994 and Hultink and Atuahene-Gima 2000)
When I engage in the activity of new product selling, I…
1 always take the initiative. (eff_1) .90
2 do not give up easily when encountering a customer to whom it is difficult to sell new products. (eff_2) .86
3 always anticipate and act upon potential problems. (eff_3) .83
4 am constantly on the lookout to identify opportunities. (eff_4) .87
5 actively scan emerging needs. (eff_5) .83
Conservative selling behavior (new scale)
Please consider the new products that were introduced in your product portfolio during the past 12 months and answer the following
statements. Over the past 12 months, I…
1 always tried to maximize my selling efforts for existing products before considering the new products. (csb_1) .85
2 preferred selling existing products above selling new products. (csb_2) .89
3 behaved cautiously in selling new products. (csb_3) .81
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product orientation on CSB is significant and negative
(CI95% = [−.33; −.01]). The main effect of long-term rewards
on CSB is significant and positive (CI95% = [.03; .29]), while
the hypothesized effect was negative. This is an interesting
finding; we return to this result and discuss potential explana-
tions below. Hence, despite the significant relationship have to
reject H3.
We now turn to the moderating effects of new product
information. The results show a positive interaction effect
of new product information and new product radicalness
(CI95% = [.04; .34]) toward CSB. In addition, the positive
interaction effect of new product information and mana-
gerial new product orientation toward CSB was supported
by the data (CI95% = [.01; .32]). This confirms H4a and
H4b. The interaction term of new product information and
long-term rewards was signif icant and negative
(CI95% = [−.31; −.01]). Because the main effect of long-
term rewards on CSB turned out positive, this negative
interaction effect aligns with our overall argument that
long-term rewards would become a less important driver
of CSB following the provision of new product informa-
tion to the salesforce. Therefore, although we formally
reject H4c, we do find empirical support for the dampen-
ing effect of new product information expected in the
hypothesis. We interpret this effect below.
Panels A, B, and C in Fig. 2 plot the results of the
interaction effects to facilitate interpretation. The plots
provide the results for values 1 standard deviation below
and above the mean of the independent variable and the
moderator. Panel A reveals that new product radicalness
leads to more CSB when new product information is high.
Remarkably, when little new product information is pro-
vided to salespeople, there seems to be no effect of new
product radicalness on CSB. Panel B shows that under
conditions of low new product information the salesper-
son follows managerial guidance and lowers his/her CSB,
presumably because being conservative entails a (too)
large perceived social risk. However, when a salesperson
receives new product information, the effect of manage-
rial orientation on CSB is neutralized because the per-
ceived performance risk becomes more salient in lieu of
perceived social risk.
Finally, Panel C shows that a similar logic applies to
financial risk: when new product information is available,
long-term rewards have little effect on CSB because per-
ceived financial risk becomes less salient in individual’s
risk assessment. Remarkably though, under low informa-
tion conditions, the effect of long-term rewards is posi-
tive. Long-term rewards motivate employees to care about
realizing the firm’s long-term revenue growth (Wei and
Table 3 Construct reliabilities and correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14.
1. Company tenure (TEN) 1.00
2. Past performance (PP) -.04 1.00
3. Pay scale (PAY) -.06 .11 1.00
4. Self-confidence (SCF) -.07 .01 .13 1.00
5. Customer rel. quality (CRQ) -.11 .04 .14 .10 1.00
6. New product advantage (NPA) .03 -.09 -.08 .08 .14 1.00
7. Managerial new product orient. (NPO) -.08 .07 -.13 .01 .11 .21** 1.00
8. Long-term rewards (LTR) .02 .01 -.03 .05 .22** .10 .30** 1.00
9. New product radicalness (NPR) -.06 .02 .11 .05 .09 -.03 -.08 -.12 1.00
10. New product information (NPI) a -.17* -.12 .01 .16* .03 .04 -.02 -.06 .10 1.00
11. Conservative selling behavior (CSB) .13 .09 .08 -.15** .04 -.07 -.16* .03 .20* .06 1.00
12. Effort to sell new products (EFF) -.13 .03 -.01 .30** .22** .08 .18* -.01 -.08 .10 -.26** 1.00
13. Managerial overall perf. evaluation .08 .27** .05 .05 .03 -.08 .02 .14 .00 -.06 .03 .24** 1.00
14. % Sales volume obtained -.04 .05 -.03 .02 .07 .23** .19* .11 -.09 -.26** -.04 .20** .13 1.00
Mean 3.3 178.3 11.7 4.2 4.1 3.5 3.7 2.8 3.4 3.0 2.4 4.2 3.1 23.8
Std. Deviation 5.3 99.2 1.0 .7 .7 .7 .8 1.1 .7 1.0 .9 .8 .6 23.4
α .87 .79 .83 .86 .73 .92 .83 .93
ρ .90 .84 .88 .91 .82 .94 .89 .94
AVE .68 .57 .59 .76 .54 .79 .73 .75
n = 172 salespeople in N = 31 sales units
** p < .01 (two-tailed). * p < .05 (two-tailed)
a Group-level variables; N = 31 observations
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Atuahene-Gima 2009). This goal can be accomplished
through the sales of any product in a salesperson’s port-
folio. Because salespeople more easily see how to realize
revenue growth through proven sellers than through
difficult-to-sell new products (Wieseke et al. 2008),
long-term rewards could perhaps de-emphasize salespeo-
ple’s concerns about a new product’s success in the
market. An alternative explanation is that long-term re-
wards and new product information substitute each
other: when salespeople have sufficient information,
there is no need for long-term rewards since salespeople
are able to make well-informed decisions.
Overall, Fig. 2 shows three distinct moderating effects (cf.
Cohen et al. 2003). Paired with new product radicalness, new
product information has a synergetic (or enhancing) effect on
CSB, paired with managerial new product orientation it has a
buffering effect, and paired with long-term rewards it has a
substitution (or antagonistic) effect.
Table 4a Unstandardized Bayesian estimated coefficients for antecedents and outcomes of CSBa
Mediator Salesperson performance outcomes
Conservative selling behavior Effort to sell new products
Model 1: Model 2: Model 2b
Direct effects only With interactions
B S.D. 95% C.I. B S.D. 95% C.I. B S.D. 95% C.I.
Intercept 1.40 (1.06) [−.69; 3.48] 1.54 (1.03) [−.49; 3.57] -1.625 (1.07) [−3.75; .50]
Controls
Company tenure (TEN) .16 * (.08) [−.01; .31] .17 * (.08) [.02; .32] -.07 (.08) [−.22; .08]
Past performance (PER) .09 (.08) [−.07; .25] .05 (.08) [−.10; .21] .05 (.08) [−.11; .20]
Pay scale (PAY) .10 (.10) [−.09; .30] .08 (.10) [−.11; .28] -.05 (.09) [−.23; .13]
Self-confidence (SCF) -.27** (.11) [−.48; −.07] -.29** (.10) [−.49; −.08] .38** (.11) [.17; .59]
Customer rel. Quality (CRQ) .05 (.08) [−.11; .21] .08 (.08) [−.07; .23] .22 ** (.08) [.07; .38]
New product advantage (NPA) -.07 (.08) [−.23; .10] -.05 (.08) [−.21; .11] .04 (.08) [−.12; .20]
Simple effects
New product radicalness (NPR) .21** (.08) [.05; .37] .18* (.08) [.02; .31] -.08 (.08) [−.24; .08]
Managerial new product orientation (NPO) -.09 (.08) [−.26; .08] -.16* (.09) [−.33;.-01] .12 (.08) [−.04; .28]
Long-term rewards (LTR) .12 (.08) [−.05; .28] .14* (.07) [.03; .29] -.08 (.08) [−.24; .08]
New product informationc (NPI) .15 (.12) [−.09; .37] .14 (.11) [−.09; .36] .11 (.47) [−.45; .63]
Conservative selling behavior (CSB) -.17* (.08) [−.33; −.01]
Cross-level interaction
NPR x NPI .19** (.08) [.04; .34]
NPO x NPI .16* (.08) [.01; .32]
LTR x NPI -.16* (.08) [−.31; −.01]
R2 19.1% 28.5% 25.7%
Boldface type indicates that the 95% posterior credibility interval (C.I.) does not include zero. S.D. = Posterior standard deviation
* = p < .05 (one-tailed); ** = p < .01 (one-tailed)
aWe conducted robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations. However, inclusion of either group-level CSB (as an additional motivation to exert
CSB) or structural market elements (see section on Robustness of results) did not alter our initial findings. For reasons of parsimony, we decided not to
report them here. More information about the robustness checks is available from the first author upon request
b For effort to sell new products, we only report the results of Model 2. They are similar to those of Model 1 because we did not hypothesize cross-level
interaction effects with effort to sell new products as a dependent variable. However, as an exploratory analysis, we estimated a model regressing effort
on all interaction effects. This did not change results
c Unit level measure
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Consequences of CSB
With regard to CSB’s consequences, the results show a negative
effect of CSB on effort to sell new products (CI95% = [−.33;
−.01]). This supports H5a. Furthermore, new product selling
effort was positively related to both performance measures, i.e.,
managerial overall performance evaluation (CI95% = [.05; .25])
and new product selling performance (CI95% = [1.87; 9.77]). This
provides support for H5b and H5c, respectively. Finally, CSB
weakened the positive relationship between effort and manager’s
evaluations (CI95% = [−.15; −.02]), providing support for H6a. In
contrast, CSB strengthened the positive relationship between ef-
fort and new product selling performance (CI95% = [.27; 6.58]) in
support of H6b. This provides evidence for the thought that
although managers see CSB as an undesirable behavior, it may
in fact benefit sales performance. Figure 3’s panels A and B
present a more detailed account of the interaction effects of effort
and CSB, again for values of 1 standard deviation below and
above the mean of the independent variable and the moderator.
To test whether effort, in its relationship with performance,
both mediates and interacts with CSB, we calculated the index
of moderated mediation for CSB (Hayes 2015). In our
Bindependent variable asmoderator^model, the indirect effect
of CSB on SPO through EFF is the product of the effect of
CSB from Eq. 2 and the conditional effect of EFF on SPO
from Eq. 3 (see Preacher et al. 2007 for a detailed discussion).
Formally:




ω ¼ α40θ20 þ α40θ40CSBij ð5Þ
with intercept α40θ20 and slope α40θ40CSBij. In this model
α40θ40CSBij is the index of moderated mediation. Using
Bayesian estimation, we obtained 95% credible intervals.
The moderated mediation indices for CSB on a manager’s
overall performance evaluation and new product selling per-
formance are both significantly different from zero
(CI95% = [.01; .04] and [−1.92; −.05], respectively). This sup-
ports the moderated mediation effect of CSB and demon-
strates that the negative indirect effect of CSB on managerial
overall performance evaluation increases with higher values
of CSB, as the slope of the line (or the index of moderated
mediation) is positive, while the negative indirect effect of
CSB on new product selling performance decreases with
Table 4b Unstandardized Bayesian estimated coefficients for antecedents and outcomes of CSBa
Salesperson performance outcomes
Managerial overall performance evaluation % Sales volume obtained
Model 1: Model 2: Model 1: Model 2:
Direct effects only With interactions Direct effects only With interactions
B S.D. 95% C.I. B S.D. 95% C.I. B S.D. 95% C.I. B S.D. 95% C.I.
Intercept 3.32** (.63) [2.08; 4.57] 3.23** (.63) [1.98; 4.48] 43.44* (26.45) [8.79; 95.68] 50.31* (26.16) [1.35; 98.97]
Controls
Company tenure (TEN) .05 (.05) [−.04; .15] .04 (.05) [−.05; .14] -1.16 (1.94) [−5.42; 2.21] -1.18 (1.94) [−5.00; 2.63]
Past performance (PER) .15* (.05) [.05; .24] .14** (.05) [.04; .23] -.99 (1.98) [−4.89; 2.87] -.57 (1.97) [−4.45; 3.28]
Pay scale (PAY) .04 (.06) [−.07; .16] .04 (.06) [−.07; .16] .49 (2.31) [−4.02; 5.07] .57 (2.30) [−3.92; 5.12]
Self-confidence (SCF) .01 (.07) [−.12; .14] .02 (.07) [−.11; .16] 1.17 (2.77) [−4.27; 6.59] .47 (2.77) [−4.95; 5.91]
Simple effects
Effort to sell new products (EFF) .16** (.05) [.06; .26] .15** (.05) [.05; .25] 5.39** (2.02) [1.43; 9.35] 5.82** (2.01) [1.87; 9.77]
Conservative selling behavior
(CSB)
.04 (.05) [−.06; .14] .05 (.05) [−.05; .14] 1.57 (2.03) [−2.41; 5.54] 1.30 (2.01) [−2.66; 5.25]
Within-level interaction
CSB x EFF -.07* (.03) [−.15; −.02] 3.15* (1.47) [.27; 6.58]
R2 R2 = 16.9% R2 = 17.7% R2 = 9.8% R2 = 12.5%
Boldface type indicates that the 95% posterior credibility interval (C.I.) does not include zero. S.D. = Posterior standard deviation
* = p < .05 (one-tailed); ** = p < .01 (one-tailed)
aWe conducted robustness checks to rule out alternative explanations. However, inclusion of either group-level CSB (as an additional motivation to exert
CSB) or structural market elements (see section on Robustness of results) did not alter our initial findings. For reasons of parsimony, we decided not to
report them here. More information about the robustness checks is available from the first author upon request
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higher values of CSB. In sum, the findings further corroborate
our expectations.
Of our control variables, company tenure positively as-
sociated with CSB (CI95% = [.02; .32]). Probably, more
tenured employees have gained more status and are reluc-
tant to incur any damage by making risky choices.
Alternatively, more tenured employees may be older and
therefore more likely to resist change and be more conser-
vative in their decision making. As expected, self-
c o n f i d e n c e a s s o c i a t e d n e g a t i v e l y w i t h CSB
(CI95% = [−.49; −.08]) and positively with effort to sell
new products (CI95% = [.17; .59]). Next, customer relation-
ship quality positively associated with effort to sell new
products (CI95% = [.07; .38]). This suggests that trusted
relations make salespeople more willing to increase their
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effort allocated to that account. An alternative explanation
could be that these accounts demand more from the sales-
person (Mullins et al. 2014). Finally, in line with previous
studies we find that past performance positively associates
with managerial overall performance evaluations
(CI95% = [.04; .23]). All of these results are intuitive and
thus offer face validity to our data and increase the confi-
dence in our outcomes.
Robustness of results
Adequacy of sample To further demonstrate the suitability
of our Sample 1 and hence the generalizability of our
findings, we triangulated our outcomes with results of
previous studies on new product selling. Specifically, we
compiled a descriptive meta-analytic overview on the re-
lationship between new product selling effort and perfor-
mance and then contrasted past findings with our results.
Table 5 shows that our results closely mirror and replicate
the stream of related work. This provides additional evi-
dence of the suitability of our data and the generalizability
of our findings.
Market context and conditions Using perceived risk pro-
cessing theory as the theoretical lens for understanding CSB,
our conceptual model focuses on the role of risk perceptions
of individual salespeople. However, it could be that CSB is
more a function of the market context and conditions into
which salespeople are selling. To rule out this alternative line
of thinking and to further demonstrate the robustness of our
findings we conducted some additional tests.
First, consistent with the company’s targeting approach we
dummy-coded four clusters of industries: (1) finance, (2) gov-
ernment & education, (3) industry & transport, and (4) ser-
vices, retail, & media. This particular coding scheme was
motivated by leading classifications of industries such as the
North American Industry Classification System (NAICS),
Eurostat, and Statistics Netherlands’ StatLine. Second, we
collected secondary data for the industries defined at a more
granular level (i.e., two-digit industry codes). Specifically, we
collected for each industry: size (i.e., number of companies
with more than 250 employees), production volume change
(production index), and innovation expenditures (in millions
of Euros). These data are considered as proxies for each
industry’s market potential, growth rate, and investments in
new technology (e.g., our Sample 1 company’s ICT solutions)
respectively. Third, we added the dummy-coded industries to
our conceptual model as covariates for CSB, effort, and per-
formance outcomes. Adding these dummies did not change
our initial findings, and none of the dummy variables turned
out to be significant. Finally, we replaced the dummies with
the three market conditions per industry. Adding these factors
did not alter the findings of our hypothesized model either.
These results support our rationale for adopting a perceptual
view on salesperson behavior and corroborate the robustness
of our findings.
Discussion
Many B2B salespeople display conservatism when
confronted with new products in their portfolio, such that they
maximize their efforts to sell existing products before engag-
ing in efforts to sell the new product. This article provides an
answer to the question of whether such conservative ap-
proaches to new product selling are a blessing in disguise.
Although anecdotal evidence existed and patches of argumen-
tation could be found in literature to argue that CSB could
benefit rather than harm the sales of new products, conserva-
tive selling approaches have remained unstudied. In response,
building on perceived risk processing theory, we established
and tested a conceptual model of antecedents and conse-
quences of CSB. We outline our findings and implications
next.
Theoretical implications
Our work has several important theoretical implications.
First, we add to existing work in new product selling by
conceptualizing, operationalizing, and validating the con-
cept of CSB. We conceptualize CSB as a sales domain–
specific behavioral representation of risk aversion. The
latter has been a central assumption in the sales domain
and in new product selling in particular (Atuahene-Gima
1997). We show that CSB differs from related constructs
such as new product selling effort.
Remarkably, we find that when salespeople first try to
sell existing products before they engage in new product
selling, their effort to sell new products more strongly
translates into percentage of sales volume obtained with
new products. Explanations for this effect can be found in
how customers strive for consistent responses to sales
requests (Cialdini and Guadagno 2004), creeping commit-
ment in B2B sales cycles, and salespeople’s potential to
better communicate the new product’s attractiveness
through highlighting new features vis-à-vis old (or miss-
ing) features (Thompson et al. 2005). Previous literature
has shown that adapting sales presentations to the nature
of the sales situation benefits overall sales performance
(Franke and Park 2006) but has remained silent on the
specific alterations needed in new product selling. We
show that the order of presenting the customer with new
and existing products is a key factor in such adaptive
strategies.
Second, we add to recent work on internal marketing of
new products (e.g., Wieseke et al. 2008). In contrast to the
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traditional view that internal marketing efforts motivate sales-
people to sell new products (Atuahene-Gima 1997; Johnson
and Sohi 2016), we show that this relationship is not straight-
forward. Salespeople perceive different risk dimensions sur-
rounding the sale of new products. Providing new product
information changes the relative weight of the dimensions in
salespeople’s decisions to act conservatively. More specifical-
ly, product radicalness (performance risk) becomes a more
important driver of CSB, while managerial orientations (social
risk) and long-term rewards (financial risk) become less im-
portant. Especially the latter finding is interesting because
without information, long-term rewards tend to increase rather
than decrease CSB. Long-term rewards may focus salespeople
on selling existing products, while short-term rewards pro-
voke risk taking.
Finally, we add to work on (sales) personnel evalua-
tion. Previous studies have showed that sales managers
are sensitive to subordinates exerting high levels of ef-
fort (Harris et al. 2014). Early work also indicates that
sales managers often fail to account for the task diffi-
culty facing their employees (Mowen et al. 1985) and
that more tactical elements such as planning ability,
judgment, and time management are of lesser impor-
tance in performance appraisals (Hawes et al. 1995;
Pettijohn et al. 2001). Our findings align with and add
more detail to these insights. We show that managers
are less appreciative of effort to sell new products when
this effort follows a period of salesperson conservatism.
Although this practice does not honor the associated
sales performance, it does suggest that sales managers
take into account a longer time-frame in their appraisals
and do not suffer from Brecency bias^ (Brown and
Heywood 2005) such that recent events have more in-
fluence on appraisals than less recent events. Our find-
ings suggest that sales managers can oversee the entire
length of the sales cycle and that they factor in the
timing of their subordinates’ effort.
Managerial implications
Our work offers important insights for managers. First, we
urge sales managers to get a better understanding of the con-
servative behavior of their salespeople. Manymanagers worry
that salespeople maximize their selling efforts for existing
products before engaging in efforts to sell the new product
and that this practice makes them less effective in selling
new products. However, a conservative selling approach
may help salespeople to provide a better pitch to customers
who are then more likely to agree to risky value propositions.
This is especially likely in B2B settings, where sales cycles
extend over time and adopting a new product means that the
customer faces significant changes to its workflows.
Table 5 Descriptive meta-analytic triangulation of previous new product selling research
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technology, industrial equipment
and systems, instruments, fabricated
metals and motor parts, chemical and
pharmaceuticals and building products
Hultink and
Atuahene-Gima (2000)













and other high-technology sectors




of sales calls made
Percentage of sales quota .1996 226 Pharmaceutical industry
Aggregated effect size: .1954 931
The present study
Sample 1 Self-reported Percentage of sales volume .2027 172 Information and communication
technology industry
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Second, managers’ better understanding of conservatism
should go hand-in-hand with rethinking salespeople’s perfor-
mance appraisals. Many managers use criteria such as product
knowledge, attitude, effort, initiative, and aggressiveness in
their performance evaluations of salespeople. Specifically,
they correlate observed lack of effort to sell new products to
a salesperson’s attitude and work motivation, consequently
attribute negative traits to him or her, and adjust their evalua-
tion of this person’s work performance downward. This may
be unfair in markets where conservative selling behavior is a
smart selling strategy.
Third, managers have routinely tried to control the
levels of conservatism in their salesforce by using in-
centive systems, being an advocate of selling new prod-
ucts, and ramping up internal marketing on new prod-
ucts toward their employees. Rather than doing all at
once, we urge managers to consider the interrelation-
ships between these control mechanisms (see Fig. 2).
Our results point to three possible control scenarios:
(1) Managers responsible for launching radically new
products can enhance CSB by setting up intensive in-
ternal marketing efforts via the provision of new prod-
uct information. In this scenario, managers are advised
to save their scarce resources of personally motivating
sales staff and installing long-term rewards systems be-
cause providing new product information makes these
mechanisms less suitable to regulate CSB. (2)
Managers responsible for launching less radically new
products can enhance CSB by rewarding the obtainment
of objectives and goals in a time frame for longer than
one year. Importantly, this strategy only works when
providing no or very limited new product information
to salespeople. (3) Managers who are looking to
decrease CSB―perhaps because of a more transactional
selling context or because CSB does not fit the organi-
zation’s image―are most successful when they do not
provide new product information and set short-term
(rather than long-term) goals. This runs counter to
present-day management practices and explains why
companies are often unsuccessful in managing CSB.
Personally motivating subordinates to sell new products
without providing new product information is likely to
further decrease CSB.
Finally, there are many trade-offs that sales em-
ployees and their managers have to make because new
products are added to a portfolio of existing products.
B2B managers could think about allocating a specific
part of their salesforce to sell new products and the
remaining part to sell existing products. An alternative
to this solution is to hire new salespeople to sell new
products. A problem here, though, is that a lower qual-
ity of customer relationships limits the knowledge ex-
change between salesperson and customer. This may
hamper the transfer of customer feedback into the
company’s development department and thus block bug
fixing and product quality improvement.
Limitations and future research
Although we believe our study has clear merits, there are
some limitations too. Some of them provide fruitful ave-
nues for future research. First, we relied on salesperson
perceptions of new product radicalness, managerial new
product orientation, and long-term rewards. Although this
fits with our perceived risk processing framework, recent
studies indicate that employee perceptions may be differ-
ent from customer-side perceptions or manager percep-
tions and relate differently to performance outcomes
(e.g., Mullins et al. 2014). Including customers as a data
source would provide further evidence for the validity of
our findings, but collecting a sample of representative
respondents is hard in B2B settings.
In addition, we demonstrated the robustness of our
findings through triangulation with previous results and
controlling for market context and conditions. We hold
that our sample profile is typical for firms with field
salesforces and frequent introductions of new products
in many industries, such as machinery, chemicals, plas-
tic materials, equipment and supplies, and pharmaceuti-
cals. Assuming that with increasing frequency of new
product introductions salespeople get more used to sell-
ing new and unfamiliar products, we expect that any
CSB-related effects also hold for (or may even be stron-
ger in) industries with a lower frequency of new prod-
uct introductions. However, in industries where compe-
tition offers similar products, salespeople have limited
time to convince customers, or where fad products are
concerned, CSB may have different effects. Future re-
search should hence substantiate the effects across in-
dustries to see in which situations CSB is most
beneficial.
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Appendix A
We further evaluated the validity of our CSB scale in
Sample 1 using a second dataset (Sample 2) obtained
from a commercially available panel of B2B salespeople.
We included our three CSB items and the scales of related
concepts in a survey that was sent to 341 salespeople. We
received 191 usable responses, for a response rate of
56.0%. On average, these salespeople had 18.03 years of
work experience in sales jobs and 9.50 years with their
company. The Sample 2 CFA showed a good fit of the
measurement model to the retest data (i.e., a ppp-value of
Table 6 Psychometric properties of conservative selling behavior scale




FL AVE CR CA FL AVE CR CA
Conservative selling behavior (new scale) .73 .89 .83 .64 .84 .73
Over the past 12 months,
1 I always tried to maximize my selling efforts for existing products
before considering the new products.
.85 .82
2 I preferred selling existing products above selling new products. .89 .86
3 I behaved cautiously in selling new products. .81 .71
Effort to sell new products (Adapted from Sujan et al. 1994 and
Hultink and Atuahene-Gima 2000)
.75 .94 .93 .61 .89 .85
When I engage in the activity of new product selling, I…
1 always take the initiative. .90 .82
2 do not give up easily when encountering a customer to whom it
is difficult to sell new products.
.86 .82
3 always anticipate and act upon potential problems. .83 .79
4 am constantly on the lookout to identify opportunities. .87 .79
5 actively scan emerging needs. .83 .61
Adaptive selling (Fang et al. 2004; Román and Iacobucci 2010) – – – .65 .90 .90
1 I use different sales strategies with different customers. – .80
2 I vary my sales style from situation to situation. – .80
3 I change my sales approach from one customer to another. – .82
4 I am very flexible in the selling approach I use. – .80
5 I tend to use a wide variety of selling approaches with different customers. – .82
Cross selling (Adapted from Schmitz 2013) – – – .51 .75 .67
Over the past 12 months,
1 I tried to cover my customers’ needs for additional products on a
broad basis.
– .54
2 I made my customers obtain additional products they required. – .77
3 I ensured that my customers purchased many additional products our company offers. – .65
4 I exploited my customers’ potential with regard to additional products extensively. – .70
New product commitment (Hultink and Atuahene-Gima 2000) – – – .65 .88 .86
1 I feel emotionally attached to the success of the new products. – .86
2 Achieving objectives for the new products has a great deal of
personal meaning to me.
– .82
3 I enjoy discussing the new products with other salespeople. – .71
4 I feel a strong sense of duty to ensure the success of the new products. – .82
5 I would be willing to make further investment of my time and energy
to support these new products.
– .83
All loadings are significant at p < .01. Fit indice (Sample 1): ppp = .862. Fit indice (Sample 2): ppp = .590. FL = factor loading,
CR = composite reliability, and CA = Cronbach’s alpha. Highest correlation between constructs in Sample 2 ρ = .58 (Effort to sell new
products—New product commitment)
Boldface type indicates latent constructs
J. of the Acad. Mark. Sci.
.590), and each indicator loaded significantly (p < .01) on
the appropriate factor. As in Sample 1, the CSB scale
displayed desirable psychometric properties. We also
found CSB to satisfy the criteria for discriminant validity
when including the related concepts from literature.
Sample 2 thus helped to empirically distinguish CSB from
the concepts we presented in Table 1. Table 6 presents our
empirical results.
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